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Social experimentation began in earnest when the New 
Jersey negative income tax experiment was launched in 1967. 
For the next 14 years, government agencies and philan 
thropic organizations sponsored a wide variety of ex 
periments and demonstrations involving innovations in 
social policy; none were more important than those concern 
ing the controversial income support-work issue. In this 
paper we consider three of the most important social policy 
experiments: the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Ex 
periment, the National Supported Work Demonstration, 
and the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project. These pro 
jects have yielded findings of broad significance to social 
policy, though the significance of their findings is only dimly 
perceived by policymakers and interested scholars. Our pur 
pose in this review is to briefly describe the experiments and 
state the main policy conclusions that can be drawn from 
them. In our final section, we will discuss some conclusions 
about the effects and value of social experiments in general.
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The Seattle-Denver Experiment
The Seattle-Denver experiment was the largest and most 
comprehensive of the Negative Income Tax (NIT) ex 
periments. It was begun in Seattle in 1970 and in Denver in 
1971 under contracts between the States of Washington and 
Colorado and the U.S. Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare. The experiment was administered by 
Mathematica, a research organization that had already gain 
ed valuable administrative experience running the New 
Jersey experiment. The Stanford Research Institute designed 
the experiment and was given major responsibility for 
evaluating it. There is no doubt that the Seattle-Denver ex 
periment was the best run of the NIT experiments, and it was 
the most thoroughly studied.
Approximately 4800 families were enrolled in the experi 
ment, and families assigned to experimental NIT plans were 
potentially eligible for payments for a period of either three 
or five years. 1 To be eligible for enrollment, families had to 
contain at least one ablebodied, nonaged adult. If only a 
single adult was present, the family was also required to have 
one or more dependent children. The sample enrolled in the 
experiment consisted of lower- and middle-income black, 
white, and Hispanic families with either one or two parents 
present. While participation was restricted to residents of 
Seattle and Denver, families could continue to participate if 
they moved out of those cities.
The experiment had two main goals, both of which were 
reflected in its rather elaborate design. The first was to deter 
mine the effect of alternative NIT plans on the work 
behavior of the poor. The second was to test the feasibility 
and effectiveness of educational vouchers aimed at low- 
income workers.
The idea behind a negative income tax is fairly well-known 
and will not be discussed in detail here. In its simplest form,
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a NIT offers a guaranteed monthly or annual income to a 
family that has no other income of its own. This amount 
varies depending on the number of persons in the family and 
was systematically varied in the experiment to measure the 
impact of higher or lower income support levels. If a family 
receives income from nonexperimental sources, such as wage 
earnings, interest, or public transfers, the monthly NIT pay 
ment is reduced in proportion to the amount of other income 
received. As income from other sources rises, the NIT pay 
ment is reduced by an amount determined by the program's 
tax (or benefit reduction) rate. The tax rate was also 
systematically varied in the experiment. When income from 
other sources is sufficiently high that the benefit reduction 
exactly offsets the income guarantee—at a point known as 
the break-even—payments under a NIT cease. A NIT's 
break-even level is algebraically determined by its guarantee 
and tax rate. As the guarantee level rises, the break-even also 
rises; as the tax rate rises, the break-even level declines.
Both theory and common sense suggest that the transfer 
scheme just described will affect work effort. Those who 
receive payments will have more income, so the necessity for 
earned income falls. Because payments are reduced as earned 
income rises, the reward for work is also affected. Under a 
benefit reduction rate of 70 percent, for example, a recipient 
who earns an additional dollar loses $0.70 in NIT benefits, 
and the net increase in income is only $0.30. The Seattle- 
Denver experiment tested 11 NIT plans with income 
guarantees ranging from slightly below to about 40 percent 
above the poverty threshold and tax rates ranging from 
about 50 to 70 percent. With this range of tested guarantees 
and tax rates, the designers hoped to detect the impact of a 
meaningful array of plans. In retrospect, we can criticize the 
designers for their conservative assessment of the meaningful 
range of tax rates. The policy debate since 1977, and 
especially since 1981, has shown that tax rates in excess of 90
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percent or even 100 percent are well within the policy- 
relevant range.
The random assignment of families or individuals to alter 
native treatments—or no treatment at all—is what gives 
social experimentation its unique advantage as a tool for 
policy analysis. With only a few modest and believable 
statistical assumptions, it is possible for the analyst of ex 
perimental data to establish a definite cause-and-effect rela 
tionship between treatment variations and observed out 
comes. The direction and precise magnitude of the relation 
ship can be established with known levels of statistical con 
fidence. In the case of the Seattle-Denver experiment, 
families were randomly assigned to 1 out of the 11 tested 
NIT plans or to control status. A family enrolled in one of 
the NIT plans was eligible to receive NIT grants if its income 
was below the plan's break-even. A family in the control 
group was not eligible to receive these experimental transfers 
but could continue to receive any nonexperimental transfers 
for which it remained eligible. The effect of the NIT plans on 
work behavior can be reliably determined simply by 
statistically comparing the work effort of individuals enroll 
ed in the various plans and in the control group.
The work-effort findings from the Seattle-Denver experi 
ment have been summarized in a final report recently issued 
by the Department of Health and Human Services. Briefly, 
the report shows that the tested NIT plans caused substantial 
reductions in labor market activity, particularly for persons 
enrolled in longer duration (5-year) plans and for women. By 
"substantial" we mean that prime-aged men reduced their 
annual hours of work by 9 or 10 percent; that their spouses 
reduced annual hours by 17 to 20 percent; and that women 
heading single-parent families reduced annual hours by more 
than 20 percent—perhaps by as much as 28 to 32 percent. 2 
These reported work reductions are large enough to cause 
alarm among conservatives already opposed to a NIT and
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even among centrists with no strong opinions about the 
desirability of a NIT.
Taken by themselves, however, the work reductions just 
reported have almost nothing to tell us about the desirability 
or feasibility of enacting a NIT. The work reductions appear 
to be fairly substantial, but the work disincentive provided 
by the tested plans was also quite substantial, larger in fact 
than that which would be provided under most proposed 
NIT plans. The Seattle-Denver plans tested an average in 
come guarantee of 115 percent of the poverty threshold and 
a marginal tax averaging only about 50 percent. In addition, 
the experiment provided rebates for state, federal, and PICA 
taxes on earned income. About 80 percent of enrolled 
families faced a break-even level that was more than one- 
and-a-half times the poverty threshold, and 50 percent faced 
a break-even more than twice the poverty level (that is, above 
$19,600 for a family of four in 1982 dollars). By contrast, the 
combined income guarantee provided by AFDC and food 
stamps is now below the poverty level in most states, and the 
break-even level for AFDC is below the poverty level in all 
but 15 states. 3
Even so, the labor supply findings from Seattle-Denver 
were considered sufficiently important to affect the welfare 
reform proposals submitted by the Carter Administration. 4 
The reason was quite simple. The results showed quite con 
vincingly that the work incentive provided by a NIT's low 
marginal tax rate was more than offset by the work disincen 
tive effects caused by higher overall transfers. For example, 
simulations based upon the Seattle-Denver results 
demonstrated that replacement of the current welfare and 
food stamp programs with a national NIT that has a 
guarantee equal to three-quarters of the poverty line and a 
marginal tax rate of 50 percent would reduce aggregate labor 
supply in two-parent families by about 1 percent. Labor sup 
ply in two-parent families with annual incomes below $5,000
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would be reduced by more than 8 percent. 3 Although we do 
not find these estimates discouraging by themselves, they 
contain an implication that is dispiriting to policymakers 
who wish to simultaneously support incomes and increase 
the self-reliance of needy families. According to the Seattle- 
Denver estimates, under the NIT plan just described it would 
cost the government $1.79 in transfer outlays to raise the net 
income of poor two-parent families by $1.00. In other 
words, 44 percent of the net program costs of the NIT would 
be "consumed" by breadwinners in the form of leisure. (The 
net program cost of the NIT is the amount by which NIT 
transfers exceed those now paid under the welfare and food 
stamp programs.)
Another important—though at first glance, per 
verse—result from the experiment was that lowering work 
incentives in transfer programs by raising their marginal tax 
rates (holding the guarantee constant) serves to increase ag 
gregate work effort. For example, if the tax rate in the NIT 
just described were raised from 50 to 70 percent, the Seattle- 
Denver results indicated that aggregate work effort would 
rise by 1 percent. 6 The result is attributable to the fact that 
while increases in marginal tax rates may indeed reduce the 
work effort of continued transfer recipients, that effect is 
more than outweighed by the increases in work effort that 
occur among those who lose benefits altogether. (Recall that 
a rise in the marginal tax rate with a constant guarantee 
causes a fall in the break-even and hence a reduction in the 
number of transfer recipients.)
If one's sole objective is to increase work effort, the recent 
increases in AFDC tax rates might conceivably be justified 
by findings of the Seattle-Denver experiment. 7 This conclu 
sion, however, rests on the premise that the main objective 
of transfer policy is to encourage work effort. In fact, the 
primary objective of a NIT is to protect the living standards 
of people who would otherwise be destitute, and to do so in
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an equitable and efficient way. The contribution of the NIT 
program to this objective, it should be noted, has received 
only slight attention in the hundreds of research reports filed 
on the NIT experiments. This in spite of the fact that the 
tested NIT plans were potentially quite effective in attaining 
that goal. Nevertheless, the Seattle-Denver experiment has 
played the useful role of overturning the notion, especially 
popular among economists and idealistic reformers, that 
lower marginal tax rates are automatically associated with a 
greater stimulus to work.
The second objective of the experiment was to test the ef 
fectiveness of issuing education and training vouchers to 
low-income breadwinners. Families in the experiment were 
randomly assigned to one of three employment-training pro 
grams or to control status. 8 All three of the labor market 
programs provided a structured course of manpower 
counseling to help participants decide on an appropriate 
strategy of employment, education, and training. This 
course was voluntary, informational in content, and non- 
directive (that is, participants were not encouraged to pursue 
any particular course of action). One of the tested programs 
offered no service beyond this counseling. The other two of 
fered subsidies to pay for some or all of the direct costs of 
schooling or training. 9 Two levels of voucher subsidy were 
tested. In the more generous plan, 100 percent of direct 
training costs were reimbursed by the experiment. In the 
other plan, only 50 percent of costs were reimbursed. Par 
ticipants could use their vouchers to pay for any education or 
training they chose, so long as it was at least tangentially 
related to improving their future job prospects.
The purpose of the vouchers was to encourage eligible 
breadwinners to invest in worthwhile training and education, 
which according to human capital theory should have im 
proved participants' employability and future earnings. Par 
ticipation in the program was reasonably high. About one-
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fifth of family heads in two-parent families used the 50 per 
cent vouchers, and over one-third used the 100 percent 
vouchers. About one-third of single mothers eligible for the 
50 percent vouchers used them, as did nearly one-half of 
those eligible for the 100 percent vouchers. Not surprisingly, 
much of the subsidy went to pay for schooling that would 
have been obtained in the absence of the program. Most of 
the subsidies paid for attendance in formal academic pro 
grams, such as those run by community colleges, rather than 
for technical training. The more generous subsidy program 
succeeded in encouraging extra investment in formal school 
ing, with the rise averaging about one-half an academic 
quarter among men eligible for the subsidies and about one 
to one-and-one-half extra quarters among eligible women. 10
The interesting finding from this experiment is the com 
plete lack of evidence that the increased investment in 
schooling by participants led to any pay-off in the job 
market. On the contrary, persons eligible for vouchers—in 
comparison to control-group members—suffered short term 
reductions in wage rates, earnings, and employment during 
the initial phase of their eligibility. And they never showed 
consistent earnings gains over the entire 6-year span for 
which information is available, a period which includes a 
fairly lengthy spell in which participants had completed their 
schooling. 11 One explanation for this result is that the 
vouchers induced significant short term reductions in work 
effort and work intensity by subsidizing an alternative use of 
time—enrollment in formal schooling. After the training was 
completed, participants' earnings failed to rise above the 
level observed in the control group because of the amount 
and character of extra schooling obtained. The amount of 
extra schooling was on average very small, and it was ap 
parently not particularly relevant to the participants' labor 
market situation. A second explanation concerns the effect 
of a rather poor and generally deteriorating labor market on
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the earnings potential of those who reduce (or cease) their 
work in order to obtain additional schooling. In such a labor 
market, the returns to work experience and job-keeping may 
be in excess of those to increased schooling. It is difficult to 
make training pay off if there are few jobs available.
Employment and training programs for the poor are 
sometimes criticized for being too rigid, too bureaucratic, 
too paternalistic, and too insensitive to the special needs of 
different clients. The experimental test of manpower 
vouchers in Seattle and Denver shows that completely decen 
tralized decisionmaking, an approach often advocated by 
economists, may not be an effective substitute for our pre 
sent arrangements, at least in the face of low labor demand. 
When given the resources and freedom to choose their own 
training strategy, low-income breadwinners appear to be no 
better at selecting a winning strategy than are the ad 
ministrators and training specialists who now run training 
and employment programs.
The National Supported Work Demonstration
The 1970's commitment to assist hard-to-employ workers 
in finding jobs is perhaps best illustrated by the Supported 
Work Program. The program was a research and demonstra 
tion program, rather than a comprehensive employment pro 
gram. It began in 1975 and was, from its inception, schedul 
ed to last five years. Its basic objective was to provide in 
dividuals who had severe employment problems with work 
experience of about one year. The work experience was pro 
vided under conditions of gradually increasing demands, 
close supervision, and work in association with a crew of 
peers. The guiding principle of the demonstration was that 
"... by participating in the program, a significant number 
of people who are severely handicapped for employment 
may be able to join the labor force and do productive work,
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cease engaging in socially destructive or dependent behavior, 
and become self-supporting members of society." 12
Four groups of employment-handicapped workers were 
eligible for the program: female long term recipients of 
AFDC, convicts recently released from prison, former drug 
addicts, and young school dropouts who often had a delin 
quency record. Fifteen sites were chosen for the program. 
While each site was given responsibility for defining the type 
of work on which it would focus and the source of local 
funds on which it would draw, the entire program had a 
common research-evaluation emphasis. Hence, a variety of 
factors were standardized across the 15 sites. These included 
the basic program design of low supervisor-participant 
ratios, steadily increasing standards of attendance, punc 
tuality, and productivity, crew work and peer group support, 
and common eligibility criteria, wage rates, and employment 
duration. Like the Seattle-Denver experiment, the Supported 
Work Demonstration used a rigorous experimental design 
involving the random assignment of applicants to ex 
perimental (participant) and control (nonparticipant com 
parison) groups. We can therefore place substantial con 
fidence in the demonstration's findings.
Over its 5-year life, the demonstration provided services to 
over 10,000 persons, although at any point in time the 
number of participants at any site was limited to 300. The 
evaluation of the demonstration was based on interviews 
with 3,214 participants and 3,402 controls. Each person in 
the research sample was interviewed prior to participation 
and given up to four additional interviews at 9-month inter 
vals.
The participants suffered severe employment handicaps. 
Fewer than one-third had graduated from high school, most 
were black or Hispanic, fewer than one-quarter were mar 
ried, the number weeks worked in the year prior to enroll-
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ment averaged six or seven, and (except for the female 
welfare group) arrest rates ranged from 54 to 100 percent. 
The work provided varied across sites, but included home 
rehabilitation, recapping tires, building furniture, and 
operating day care centers. Some program outputs were sold 
in the market in order to raise revenues for the program.
The program performance of the four enrolled groups 
varied considerably. Supported Work proved most effective 
in preparing the welfare women who had least work ex 
perience for gainful employment. It also had a significant 
impact on the ex-addict group. For the ex-offender group, 
the results were marginal and not statistically significant, 
while no long term positive results were found for the group 
of young dropouts. Overall, the participants in the program 
stayed an average of 6.7 months, even though the goal of the 
demonstration was about 12 months of participation. Thirty 
percent of the participants were fired because of poor perfor 
mance; an equivalent number, however, moved on to full- 
time regular jobs. (The successful transition rate improved 
steadily over the course of the program.) About 10 percent 
of the participants (25 percent of the long term welfare 
women) had to be released after 12 months of participation, 
because their maximum permissible program stay had been 
attained. The average cost to the public per recipient was 
$5,740, but because most participants stayed in the program 
less than one year, the average cost per service year was over 
$10,000. This cost declined steadily over the five years of the 
demonstration and is about the same as the service-year cost 
in another targeted training program, Job Corps.
The program had a variety of impacts on its participants in 
areas ranging from drug use and criminal activity to employ 
ment behavior and welfare dependency. The AFDC group 
showed the most consistently positive response to the 
demonstration. In this group, participation was associated 
with increases in employment rate, hours worked, and earn-
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ings, both during and after the period of program participa 
tion. In addition, there was a significant reduction in welfare 
dependency as well as reduction in the average amount of 
food stamps and other transfers received. The welfare 
women helped most by Supported Work tended to be older 
(between 36 and 44), to be less educated, to have been on 
welfare for a longer period, and to have little or no prior 
work experience. At least the last three of these effects would 
have been difficult to predict prior to the program, and in 
deed are somewhat surprising.
Among ex-addicts the demonstration raised employment 
and reduced criminal activity, but failed to have a statistical 
ly significant impact on drug use. The main impact on 
criminal activity seems to have been concentrated in the first 
18 months after enrollment in the demonstration. The 
demonstration's effect on employment probably persisted 
for longer than that. Ex-convicts in the demonstration do 
not seem to have been helped as much as the two groups just 
mentioned. The demonstration did not affect employment, 
welfare dependence, drug use, or criminal activity after par 
ticipation ended. Similarly, the youth enrollees were not 
helped much, if at all, by the program. In this case, however, 
the evaluators found evidence that the target group was 
probably more employable than originally believed. At some 
time during the period of the study, between 80 and 90 per 
cent of youth dropouts in the control group held a job. This 
level far exceeds the rate of the other three control groups 
studied, indicating that the youth group was less disadvan- 
taged than the other target groups enrolled.
The Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation and 
Mathematica conducted a very careful benefit-cost evalua 
tion of the demonstration. They computed the benefits and 
costs of the program from three different perspectives—that 
of program participants, that of taxpayers, and that of socie 
ty as a whole (participants and taxpayers). The social
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benefits include the output produced by workers in the pro 
gram, increases in their post-program earnings, reductions in 
criminal activities, and savings from reduced participation in 
other public employment, training, or drug treatment pro 
grams. The social costs include all program operating costs 
(excluding transfer payments, however, because these are 
simply a redistribution of income). The benefit-cost tabula 
tions were based on extrapolations over the typical working 
life of the participants, with benefits assumed to decay at a 
rate of 50 percent every five years except among AFDC 
mothers where no decay rate in benefits is assumed.
The benefit-cost analysis showed that the demonstration 
had considerable net social payoff for the welfare mothers 
enrolled, primarily due to the long term earnings gains 
assumed and the value of the output from the demonstration 
jobs. Benefits also exceeded costs for the ex-addicts, in large 
part because of the reduction in socially destructive behavior 
(i.e., crime) and the gains in employment and earnings. For 
ex-convicts the results were less conclusive. The net benefit 
of the program may have been positive or negative depend 
ing on the assumptions used to value the benefits of the pro 
gram. Not surprisingly in view of the estimated impact of the 
demonstration on youths, the program's cost was found to 
outweigh its benefits for the youth dropout group.
Because of the very specific nature of the treatment tested 
in the Supported Work Demonstration, it is difficult to draw 
broad policy conclusions from its results. The finding that 
the Supported Work approach had its greatest payoff in the 
case of AFDC mothers is consistent with a few other findings 
from the last decade of research on training and employment 
programs. Some of the studies of the Continuous 
Longitudinal Manpower Survey (CLMS) have also conclud 
ed that disadvantaged women helped by CETA appear to ob 
tain the greatest program benefit. Similarly, in the Seattle- 
Denver experiment, the only group to show a positive impact
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from the counseling program (as distinct from the voucher 
program) was the sample of unmarried women with 
children. Also, as we shall see below, the Employment Op 
portunity Pilot Project appeared to have a more consistently 
and significantly positive effect on unmarried women than 
on other groups served. It would thus appear that single 
mothers are more susceptible to being helped by public train 
ing and employment efforts than other groups of hard-to- 
employ workers.
The Employment Opportunity Pilot Project
The history of the Employment Opportunity Pilot Pro 
ject—or EOPP—was a tumultuous one, marked by shifting 
objectives and premature cancellation. It is said that we learn 
from our mistakes. If this were true, EOPP should have been 
one of the most richly informative demonstrations ever 
undertaken. The project was begun by the Carter Ad 
ministration in order to estimate participation rates and 
potential effects of a guaranteed jobs program similar to that 
proposed in Carter's welfare reform package. Alarmed by 
the work effort reductions estimated in the Seattle-Denver 
experiment, the Administration was determined to limit the 
work disincentive effects of its welfare proposal by requiring 
certain welfare recipients to accept public service employ 
ment (PSE) if they were unable to obtain unsubsidized jobs. 
The President's welfare reform efforts were twice rebuffed 
by Congress, but his PSE proposals were treated more sym 
pathetically. In 1978 Congress permitted the Department of 
Labor to set up a 14-site pilot test of a guaranteed jobs pro 
gram.
Even before the first EOPP enrollments took place in 
1979, the basic objectives of the demonstration had already 
been modified. This was due in part to the Administration's 
evolving objectives in reforming welfare and GET A. In addi 
tion to simply providing a test of the guaranteed jobs con-
Three Labor Market Experiments 119
cept, which was expected to be very expensive, the architects 
of EOPP also hoped to test new approaches to job finding 
among the hard-core unemployed. If applicants for PSE 
jobs could be required to participate in intensive and struc 
tured programs of job finding, and if those programs turned 
out to be successful, the "demand" for PSE job slots, and 
hence the cost of PSE, could be limited.
At the time the demonstration began in 1979, its objective 
was to determine whether a program that provided a com 
bination of ". . . job search assistance and subsidized 
employment and training could succeed in increasing the 
employment and, hence, reducing the welfare dependence of 
adults in low-income families with children. The program, 
targeted primarily toward families that were receiving 
AFDC, provided participants with intensive job search 
assistance and support services, such as child care and 
transportation assistance. Participants who were unsuc 
cessful at finding an unsubsidized job after a'prescribed 
period of active search were offered a subsidized job or 
training." 13
When President Reagan took office in 1981, the goals of 
the program, or at least the focus of the program evaluation, 
shifted once again. The new Administration wished to 
abolish public service jobs, not to pilot test a program that 
guaranteed them. It emphatically signaled this goal by end 
ing enrollments into EOPP's PSE jobs program, sharply 
curtailing enrollment in other components of the EOPP pro 
gram, and prematurely terminating the entire project in Oc 
tober 1981, less than two-and-one-half years after operations 
began in 1979. Mathematica, the prime research contractor 
for the project, was directed to discover the impact, if any, 
of EOPP's job search assistance program and to provide a 
cost-benefit analysis of that program.
The implementation of EOPP and its evaluation were 
seriously harmed by these shifts in program objective. The
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original research and implementation design of EOPP was 
sensible for a pilot test of a guaranteed jobs program. 
However, it was extremely deficient for evaluating alter 
native approaches to job search assistance, the goal em 
phasized in the final evaluation contract. The available con 
trol group was ill-suited to examining job search assistance. 
To evaluate a guaranteed jobs program it is necessary to con 
duct saturation demonstrations under a variety of local labor 
market conditions. By saturation demonstrations we mean 
that the program had to be offered on an unlimited basis to 
all income-eligible families in a particular community. 
Saturation was required in order to determine participation 
rates in a well-publicized program and, equally important, to 
see whether such a program would seriously disrupt local 
labor markets by driving down the available supply of labor 
for unsubsidized employment. To see how local labor 
market conditions were affected by EOPP, it was necessary 
to obtain a basis for comparison. Mathematica and DOL of 
ficials selected 14 comparison sites to be used as a "control 
group" for the 14 pilot sites in the demonstration. (Because 
"control sites" were selected, EOPP might arguably be call 
ed an experiment rather than a demonstration project. 
However, eligibility for treatment was not randomly assign 
ed to individuals except in Dayton and Philadelphia, and 
hence the project was probably closer to an ordinary 
demonstration than to a formal social experiment.) This 
strategy required massive amounts of household interview 
ing in both pilot and comparison sites.
Only a small proportion of these household interviews 
would have been needed for an adequate assessment of the 
job search assistance program by itself. Moreover, the ex 
perimental and control groups should have been randomly 
selected from the eligible population in the pilot sites. In 
deed, for testing job search assistance, an experimental 
design involving at most a few thousand participants and 
controls in selected labor market environments is all that
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would have been required. Neither saturation, nor multiple 
control sites, nor massive interviewing would have been 
necessary.
EOPP was adminstered by the state and local officials 
(prime sponsors) responsible for administering local CETA 
programs. The competence and commitment of local ad 
ministrators thus varied considerably. The prime sponsors 
were responsible for publicizing the availability of EOPP 
services, identifying, recruiting, and determining the 
technical eligibility of potential clients, providing support 
services like child care for enrolled participants, establishing 
and administering a structured program of job search 
assistance, and providing public service jobs, work ex 
perience slots, and classroom and on-the-job training oppor 
tunities for clients unable to obtain unsubsidized employ 
ment. The broad character of program responsibilities and 
the potential for administrative discretion at each point are 
noteworthy, and they threaten the reliability of evaluation 
findings. We simply cannot be confident about the exact 
nature of the treatment as delivered in the field.
EOPP tested self-directed job search methods that are 
quite distinct from the job referral and job development 
techniques usually used in the Employment Service or 
CETA. Clients were taught effective methods of job search 
and encouraged to follow a rigorous and structured routine 
in looking for employment. People who could not find un 
subsidized jobs in five to eight weeks were offered a subsidiz 
ed employment or training position, which could last up to 
one year before workers or trainees were recycled through 
the job search assistance program. Workers in PSE jobs and 
OJT training positions were paid regular wages, while those 
in work experience or classroom training slots were given a 
weekly training stipend.
To be eligible for EOPP job search assistance, applicants 
had to be adult members of families that included one or
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more children and that either received AFDC or had income 
below 70 percent of BLS's Lower Living Standard. To be 
eligibile for subsidized employment or training, individuals 
were required to complete the job search phase of the pro 
gram without obtaining unsubsidized employment and, in 
addition, be the family's primary earner and either receive 
AFDC or have low enough income to qualify for AFDC. In 
most sites the program was aimed primarily at adult AFDC 
recipients.
Mathematica's evaluation of EOPP covers only 10 of the 
14 communities involved in the demonstration. In those ten 
communities it is estimated that over 190,000 adults were 
eligible for EOPP services at some point during the 
demonstration. 14 However, of that total only 120,000 were 
eligible for the full range of EOPP services, including sub 
sidized employment and training. Only 21,000—or 18 
percent—of those fully eligible chose to enroll in EOPP. An 
additional 2,000 adults eligible only for job search assistance 
also enrolled in the program. 15 Of those individuals who fill 
ed out the forms to enroll, only about 62 percent remained in 
the program long enough to receive some job search 
assistance. One-third of the people receiving job search help 
obtained an unsubsidized job. Only 4,100—or 17 percent of 
enrollees—remained with the program long enough to 
receive subsidized employment or training, of which approx 
imately two-thirds were assigned to PSE jobs. 16 Thus, of the 
120,000 potential participants in EOPP's "guaranteed jobs" 
program, fewer than 3 percent actually obtained PSE jobs.
The striking feature of these statistics is the very small pro 
portion of program eligibles who actually received program 
services, especially very expensive services like subsidized 
jobs and training. This suggests that a guaranteed public 
jobs program aimed at the welfare-eligible poor would be 
considerably less expensive than anticipated by the Carter 
Administration, which expected a much higher participation
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rate. On the other hand, the program would also be much 
less successful than expected in reducing welfare 
dependence, since only a small percentage of AFDC reci 
pients would apparently be forced to participate in such a 
program. 17 In part the low participation rate in the jobs pro 
gram was attributable to uncertain guidelines from the 
Labor Department, poor program administration at the 
local level, normal start-up problems, and a lack of publicity 
for the program. Even with these problems it was 
astonishing to program operators that so small a proportion 
of obviously eligible people chose to enroll. Among AFDC 
recipients who were mandatory participants in the WIN pro 
gram (and thus likely to be ready to hold a job), only one- 
third enrolled in EOPP, and the availability of EOPP was 
widely advertised among that group. 18 Among nonrecipients 
of AFDC who were eligible for EOPP PSE jobs, only 8 per 
cent enrolled in the EOPP program. 19
In view of the apparently generous offer provided by the 
program, this studied indifference to EOPP is interesting. Of 
course, it is possible to keep enthusiasm for public jobs down 
by erecting enough bureaucratic hurdles—a complex and 
lengthy application process, mandatory participation in a 
job search program, and potentially lengthy delays before 
assignment to a PSE job. Nonetheless, it appears that the at 
tractiveness of a temporary PSE job paying between one and 
two times the minimum wage is not nearly as great as 
sometimes assumed. Even though EOPP provided a highly 
imperfect test, the administration of the demonstration was 
probably not perceptibly inferior to what would be provided 
in an on-going program. The local administrators of the pro 
gram were after all the same people responsible for ad 
ministering CETA and are probably now running training 
and referral programs under JTPA. If there is any future 
consideration of a guaranteed jobs program for welfare reci 
pients, EOPP has taught us that both the costs and benefits
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will be considerably below what was expected in the 
mid-1970s.
What of the other objectives of the project? The evalua 
tion contractor concluded that the job search assistance pro 
gram run by EOPP was probably effective in helping par 
ticipants find jobs. Enrollees in the job search assistance pro 
gram increased the amount and effectiveness of their search 
efforts. In comparison to unemployed workers in the target 
population who did not enroll in EOPP, participants spent 
nearly twice as many hours a week searching for a job, con 
tacted about four times as many potential employers, and fil 
ed approximately 75 percent more formal job applications. 20 
As mentioned earlier, about one-third of enrollees receiving 
job search help landed an unsubsidized job. Although it is 
unclear how much of an improvement is indicated by this 
placement rate, Mathematica concluded that for the largest 
group of enrollees—single mothers—EOPP probably raised 
the employment rate by 10 to 12 percentage points and raised 
the probability of unsubsidized employment by 7 to 9 
percentage points. 21
Because EOPP was so poorly designed to measure the ef 
fectiveness of job search assistance, Mathematica could not 
determine the fraction of the employment gain that was due 
solely to the job search plans tested. Nor were the researchers 
able to reliably measure the impact of EOPP on the other 
groups served—married women and men with dependent 
children. Mathematica could detect no impact of the pro 
gram on welfare dependency, a surprising finding in view of 
the population served by EOPP, which consisted over 
whelmingly of public assistance recipients. Because EOPP 
and its evaluation were terminated with unseemly haste in 
1981, we will never know whether the employment gains 
registered by EOPP participants were temporary or long- 
lasting. Nor can we ascertain whether welfare dependency 
was eventually affected by the program. Because of the
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limitations described above, Mathematica was unable to per 
form a benefit-cost analysis of the job search program alone, 
although the analysts did conclude that the EOPP project's 
overall social benefits probably exceeded its social costs. 
Based on our reading of the evidence, it appears that a 
modest and comparatively inexpensive program to help low- 
income breadwinners search for work may reduce spells of 
unemployment and raise the fraction of time spent working. 
Even though it is doubtful that this kind of help will change 
many workers' lives or radically change the nature of jobs 
they obtain, the help is nonetheless worthwhile, and it comes 
at relatively low cost.
Before concluding this discussion of EOPP, we should 
also note that some of the pilot sites tested variants of the 
basic self-directed job search model. One of the most in 
teresting variants was tested in Dayton, Ohio where wage- 
subsidy vouchers were distributed to a randomly selected 
subgroup of enrollees in the job search classes. The vouchers 
were simply certificates provided to participants to help them 
in their search for work. Participants were encouraged to 
alert potential employers of their vouchered status. If a 
vouchered job seeker was hired by a qualified employer, the 
employer could claim a subsidy for a fraction of the wages 
paid to the newly hired worker. The subsidy was payable 
either in the form of a tax credit or a direct check payment to 
the employer. It was worth up to $4,500 over a 2-year period.
In effect, the vouchered workers were "on sale." 
Employers, however, appeared to regard these workers as 
damaged goods. In comparison to unvouchered participants 
in the EOPP program, vouchered job seekers were 
significantly less likely to obtain employment during their 5- 
or 8-week job search period. Although this experiment is 
limited in many ways, and the research on it was discon 
tinued too early to be definitive, the findings are intriguing. 
The basic result appears to show that a targeted wage 
voucher may hurt rather than help a job seeker's chances of
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employment. It should thus come as no surprise that our na 
tion's two most important wage subsidy programs—the 
WIN and Targeted Jobs tax credits—are so little used. 
Because the stigma associated with these programs may 
outweigh their tax advantages to employers, the unemployed 
may be reluctant to use them and employers may be less like 
ly to hire job seekers who offer them.
A Moral and Some Lessons
Social experiments have primarily been tools of social 
scientists seeking guidance for effective policy reform or in 
novation, but their conclusions have often been very 
pessimistic for those wishing to change public policy. Ac 
cording to the Foreword of the New Jersey Income 
Maintenance Experiment final report, the decision to under 
take that experiment was based on the ". . . rapid spread of 
the belief, especially among economists, that negative in 
come taxation was an idea whose time had come." 22 After 
the New Jersey Experiment began, two Presidents—Nixon 
and Carter—proposed variants of a federal negative income 
tax, but in neither case was the cause of the proposal advanc 
ed by findings from the experiments. In fact, the high price 
tag of the proposed Carter plan, which certainly harmed its 
chances of enactment, was estimated using interim results 
from the Seattle-Denver experiment.
Because of the rigor with which experiments are designed 
and evaluated there may be a bias toward reaching 
pessimistic conclusions about policies that are experimental 
ly tested. The tested program is subject to critical examina 
tion of a type that is rarely imposed on existing programs. 
Such an examination is likely to reveal undesirable or even 
pernicious side-effects of a policy that might not otherwise 
be detected. Consider, for example, the earned income tax 
credit. Under this apparently benign provision of the tax 
code, refundable tax credits are provided to low-wage 
workers who have dependents. The purpose of the credit is
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to encourage work effort. If this policy were systematically 
evaluated using the methods applied to social experiments, 
the credit might be shown to reduce work effort or en 
courage family dissolution as the NIT was found to do. In 
deed, the credit increases work disincentives because it in 
creases marginal tax rates for more workers than are eligible 
for a subsidy on marginal work. If these effects were found 
to occur, and if they were widely publicized, the credit could 
be politically doomed. However, such effects are unlikely to 
be investigated because of the program's uncontroversial 
nature.
Numerous other examples could be mentioned. Do sub 
sidized student loans stimulate increases in education? If 
they do, is the added investment in education worth its social 
and private cost? Do business tax reductions and other state- 
local subsidy programs to attract new business achieve their 
goals? Such programs could conceivably reduce or delay 
local investment projects if businesses delayed their decisions 
as a result of their efforts to attract subsidy support.
If an experimentally tested program fails to achieve its in 
tended purpose, or if it has disagreeable consequences, those 
facts can be demonstrated with statistical rigor. Even more 
disturbing, if the program fails to achieve spectacular 
positive results, the degree to which it falls short of perfec 
tion can be measured precisely and then used as an argument 
against its implementation. If on the other hand an on-going 
program does not achieve its objectives or does harm, its 
failure may remain unsuspected, or at least unproved.
As an empirical fact, politically divisive policies are the 
ones most likely to be subject to rigorous experimenta 
tion—negative income taxation, housing vouchers for the 
poor, national health insurance, and labor market assistance 
to low-income workers. Programs aiding the able-bodied 
poor are among those with the weakest popular mandate, 
and hence their reform will nearly always inspire deep con-
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troversy. It is unclear whether experimentation per se can 
shed much light on the main points at issue—the demands of 
equity, the nature of a fair distribution, and the limit of 
society's obligation to help those who are at least partly able 
to help themselves. Our experience in the last fifteen years 
has taught us that large-scale social experiments can be relied 
on to teach us something of value about the policy in ques 
tion, but what we are taught can seldom be relied on to aid 
the cause of reforming or improving policy. Since society is 
not even-handed in subjecting programs for the poor and 
nonpoor to experimental investigation, we should not be sur 
prised that experimental scrutiny has been less than kind to 
programs for the poor. There is a moral here, and it is il 
lustrated in the three experiments we have considered: if you 
advocate a particular policy reform or innovation, do not 
press to have it tested.
Beyond this political economy moral, are there lessons for 
research or evaluation that can be gleaned from the ex 
periments? One such lesson concerns the costs and benefits 
of large-scale social experimentation relative to nonex- 
perimental social research. Clearly, the research costs of 
social experimentation are enormous. For the three ex 
periments reviewed here, the costs of program administra 
tion (including experimental transfers, stipends, and wages) 
and evaluation exceeded $200 million. The potential benefits 
in terms of additions to knowledge may also be substantial, 
especially when it is recognized that obtaining reliable infor 
mation about human behavior is usually a slow process. 
However, if the opportunity cost of any proposed experi 
ment is a reduction in nonexperimental research costing the 
same amount of money, the expected findings would have to 
be extremely valuable for the benefits of an experiment to ex 
ceed its cost. Of course, this conclusion is weaker if the op 
portunity cost of the resources used for experimentation is 
low. This would be the case, for example, for resources that 
are diverted from some activity with low social value.
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In view of the high cost of experiments, it is appropriate to 
subject proposals for future experiments to a test that in 
cludes the following questions:
1. Have adequate models of the behavior which the ex 
perimental treatment is designed to affect been 
developed and tested on existing bodies of data?
2. Can the experiment and its evaluation meet high stan 
dards of basic research? That is, can problems of time 
horizon, contamination, Hawthorne effects, replicabili- 
ty, and extrapolation of results to a national program be 
handled adequately in the experimental design or in the 
evaluation of experimental results?
3. Can the experiment provide evidence about a social 
policy that cannot be obtained using less expensive, 
nonexperimental methods? Alternatively, can the ex 
periment provide findings that are sufficiently more 
reliable or statistically precise to justify the added cost 
of the research?
4. How important are the potential research findings 
about experimental outcomes? Are they crucial in deter 
mining whether the tested treatment is a good or bad 
policy?
5. Can the experiment permit tests and evaluation of the 
operational feasibility of social policy measures and 
yield evidence on the effectiveness of alternative ad 
ministrative arrangements of such programs?
6. Can the experimental findings be validly generalized to 
infer the consequences of policies not specifically tested 
in the experiment?
The number of potential social experiments that can pass 
the test implied by these questions is not likely to be large. 
This conclusion is strengthened by our review of the findings 
of the three experiments. While the evidence on behavioral
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responses is more reliable than is likely to be obtained from 
nonexperimental research, its value, in terms of added 
knowledge per dollar of cost, was not uniquely high except in 
the case of the tested NIT plans. For the training and 
employment experiments, including the one run as part of 
the Seattle-Denver experiment, the programs tested were so 
specific in nature that it is difficult to extrapolate the find 
ings except to other programs that are run exactly as they 
were. (For EOPP, even this may be impossible because the 
tested treatments are essentially nonreplicable.)
The NIT experiment was more valuable for two reasons. 
Its findings were considerably more reliable and statistically 
precise than any that had been obtained in the preceding 10 
years of nonexperimental research. Moreover, its findings 
are useful in evaluating tax and welfare policies in addition 
to those actually tested in Seattle-Denver, in part because 
there is a well-developed theory for assessing labor supply 
responses to tax rates and guarantees.
But the exception represented by the Seattle-Denver ex 
periment is rare. Many conceivable experiments in the field 
of employment and training must concentrate on testing 
"black box" treatments. Supported Work and the job club 
model tested in EOPP both represent this kind of treatment. 
There is no well-established theory, as existed in the case of 
the NIT experiments, that permits us to predict whether and 
how these particular approaches will affect participants. Nor 
can we predict from experimental findings the effect of 
similar—but not identical—policy options. This lack of 
knowledge regarding the process by which treatment affects 
performance limits the applicability of the findings. In the 
case of both Supported Work and EOPP, the treatment 
tested was of little interest by the time the research was com 
pleted, and the findings, in turn, were of limited value in 
assessing policy options then being considered.
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Black box experiments can be valuable in employment and 
training research if they are relatively inexpensive but 
rigorous and if there is systematic variation in the treatments 
which are tested. Investing large sums of money to test a 
single approach is likely to be a serious error except under 
very unusual conditions. To justify its high cost, a social ex 
periment must offer the prospect of valuable additions to 
knowledge about human behavior. In light of the moral 
mentioned above, the benefits of an experiment will seldom 
include basic reforms to policy.
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1. A very small number of families were enrolled in experimental plans 
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Experiment Final Report, Government Printing Office, Washington, 
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Research Association Proceedings, 1979, pp. 46-56.
5. Implementing a NIT program for single-parent families, given the 
combination of existing transfer programs, is difficult. Because of the 
widely varying AFDC benefit levels across states, it is difficult to select a 
NIT guarantee level that is low enough to be affordable, but high enough 
so that only a small fraction of families in the high-benefit states receive 
a NIT payment that is no lower than their current benefit. A national 
NIT plan with a guarantee equal to three-quarters of the poverty line 
would increase labor supply among single mothers, not because of the 
work incentive embodied in a low tax rate, but because transfer benefits 
would be slashed for so many mothers in states currently paying high 
benefits.
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Human Services, Government Printing Office, pp. 180-87.
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rates tested in the experiment, however, higher tax rates appear to be 
associated with higher aggregate labor supply. See Ibid., p. 182.
8. Assignments to the employment-training programs were conducted in 
such a way that analysts were able to reliably distinguish the separate im 
pacts of those programs and the tested NIT plans.
9. Reimbursable (or direct) expenses included costs for tuition, books, 
transportation, and child care.
10. Note that this was the impact on program eligibles; the impact on 
program participants was of course much greater. The 50 percent subsidy 
also encouraged some extra schooling, but the increases were smaller. 
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Social Science Research report to the National Commission on Employ 
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17. We should emphasize that the low participation of welfare recipients 
in the demonstration was partly attributable to poor enforcement of job 
search requirements in local welfare departments. If the job search/PSE 
jobs and welfare programs were more tightly coordinated, the costs and 
hence potential benefits of an EOPP-type program might have been 
greater.
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